World Order by Henry Kissinger

I do not share many opinions with Kissinger - and he will not be very troubled to hear this - but given that he has played such an important part in world politics, and has been directly engaged in decisions as serious as war and peace, it is well worth while to see the myths by which he lives. 

The first two chapters set out his understanding of power politics. "No truly global "world order" has ever existed. What passes for order in our time was devised in Western Europe nearly four centuries ago at a peace conference in the German region of Westphalia, conducted without the involvement or even the awareness of most other continents or civilisations... The Westphalian peace reflected a practical accommodation, not a unique moral insight. It relied on a system of independent states refraining from interference in each other's domestic affairs and checking each other's ambitions through a general equilibrium of power... Division and multiplicity, an accident of Europe's history, became the hallmarks of a new system of international order with its own distinct outlook." He contrasts this system with the Russian project of that time, to impose a single, autocratic ruler and a unified religious orthodoxy over a continually expanding empire; with the Chinese Emperor holding sway over "All Under Heaven," the pinnacle of a cultural hierarchy radiating from the centre of the world in the Chinese capital outward to all of humanity; with Islam's vision of a single, divinely sanctioned governance uniting and pacifying the world. Kissinger argues that in time, the USA also departed from the Westphalian model, instead advocating liberal democracy and free market economics as a universal aspiration to be actively promoted and even imposed. He never actually seems to criticise the USA's actions, but it is hard not to use his theoretical framework to identify major problems. 

Kissinger's sweeping survey of the use made in Europe of the Balance of Power, not to prevent war but to restrain its violence and scope, is to my mind very clever, culminating in a snappy explanation for the outbreak and consequences of the First World War. With his model in mind, it becomes terribly easy to see the strategic disaster of the way that war was ended, failing to draw either Germany or Russia into the new order, installing a string of small and hard to defend states along the their borders, virtually inviting the great powers to snack on them at leisure. He contrasts this with the 1815 peace after the defeat of Napoleon, when France was immediately restored to its proper place in the order of things. 

He moves on to give a dry and not very useful account of the Middle East and modern Islam, in which Israel is hardly noticed, before a much more lively chapter about Iran. This is both informative and, to my surprise, respectful of the Iranian approach to diplomacy. Quite simply the Iranian strategy is to seek the complete removal of American and Western influence from the region and to replace the colonial legacy with a restoration of Islamic culture. It is not difficult to consider this account as one that would be compatible with the sentiments in Edward Said's Orientalism, as others too have observed. Of course, Kissinger does not dwell on the negative aspects of America's role in the region. Although this comes later in the book, his account of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are brief but not without insights. His discussion of Afghanistan especially give a strong impression that he has no patience with American fantasies about the introduction of a western style democracy into a land of diverse local tribes, lacking traditions of even centralized government, and he implies that stronger neighbours will almost certainly intervene in time, reiterating the violent cycle. 

His discussions of Japan and of India are succinct. He has far more to say about China, not least to emphasize the continuity of modern and historic Chinese diplomatic strategies, but he talks about Mao in such bland terms that we have to assume he is being diplomatic himself. This does not matter - we have other sources for that. 

Two chapters directly concerned with the history of the USA give a very clear exposition of the major events of the past two centuries and offer some good insights, notably in his brief discussion of the Vietnam War and the domestic US opposition to that. He is not at all embarrassed to describe the various expressions of American "exceptionalism" which to my mind are in fact unpleasant. He quotes Thomas Jefferson: "We feel that we are acting under obligations not confined to the limits of our own society. It is impossible not to be sensible that we are acting for all mankind; that circumstances denied to others, but indulged to us, have imposed on us the duty of proving what is the degree of freedom and self-government in which a society may venture to leave its individual members." This is a thread running through the story of the USA, heard for instance in President Reagan's speech about the USA as a "City on the Hill." I have no problem with the idea that the world should watch and learn from America's experience, but I do object to the delusion that the world offers no reciprocal lessons for the Americans. 

The book closes with a review of some implications of new technologies, most importantly nuclear weapons and proliferation, but also cyber warfare and the political impact of the internet and search engines. "For most of history, technological change unfolded over decades and centuries of incremental advances that refined and combined existing technologies. Even radical innovations could over time be fitted within previous tactical and strategic doctrines: tanks were considered in terms of precedents drawn from centuries of cavalry warfare, airplanes could be conceptualised as another form of artillery, battleships as mobile forts, and aircraft carriers as airstrips. For all their magnification of destructive power, even nuclear weapons are in some respects an extrapolation from previous experience." He goes on from this to worry that computers and the internet might present insoluble problems but that is hardly the lesson to draw from the lines just quoted. He seems specifically worried that the role of serious minded foreign policy experts might be undermined and a lower calibre of politician attracted to high office. "What once had been substantive debates about the content of governance will reduce candidates to being spokesmen for a marketing effort... The candidates' main role may become fund-raising rather than the elaboration of issues. Is the marketing effort designed to convey the candidates' convictions or are the convictions expressed by the candidate the reflections of a "big-data" research effort...? If the gap between the qualities required for election and those essential for the conduct of office becomes too wide, the conceptual grasp and sense of history that should be part of foreign policy may be lost..."

This book will certainly help to give us a better "conceptual grasp and sense of history." It does paint a pretty picture of American activities on the world stage, and omits mention altogether of some difficult topics - notably Israel, or Central America - but to be fair it leaves enough material to permit a more challenging interpretation. If he were forced to be honest, I am confident he would agree that America's role as a "City on the Hill" is simply not in keeping with the Westphalian values which Kissinger presents as such an excellent model for a new world order. He does not advocate a perfect world, but one that we can all live in, with our diverse values and priorities. I like that model and much to my surprise, I very much liked Kissinger's book.